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Abstract
This paper examines irreversible investment in a project with uncertain returns, when
there is an advantage to being the first to invest and externalities to investing when others
also do so. We show that the possibility of pre-emption can have significant qualitative
and quantitative effects on the relationship between uncertainty and investment. In a
single-agent real options model, the trigger threshold for investment increases without
bound as uncertainty grows. In contrast, the investment trigger of a leader faced with
pre-emption is bounded above as uncertainty increases. In fact, we show that under
certain parameter values, greater uncertainty can lead the leader to invest earlier. These
findings reinforce the importance of extending real options analysis to include strategic
interactions between players. Applications to industry situations are also discussed.
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1 Introduction
The literature on irreversible investment under uncertainty teaches three major lessons. First,
the net present value (NPV) rule for investment is generally incorrect, since it considers only
a now-or-never decision and fails to appreciate that the ability to delay investment may be
important when future return is uncertain. Secondly, an option value is created by the fact
that the return is bounded below by the payoff from not investing; the effect of this option
value is to raise the threshold for a project to be undertaken, delaying investment relative
to the NPV rule. Finally, the greater the degree of uncertainty, the higher this trigger: an
increase in uncertainty increases the upside potential from investment, and so increases the
value of the investment option.
The early literature on the ‘real options’ approach analyses investment decisions for a
single agent in isolation. In many real world cases, however, investment takes place in a more
competitive environment in which there are externalities and strategic interactions between
investing agents. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that such interactions can have
important consequences for irreversible, uncertain investments, with effects that run counter
to the standard results given above. In particular, we study the role of uncertainty in an
environment where the timing of investment is affected by the threat of pre-emption.
We analyse irreversible investment in a project with uncertain returns in a dynamic two-
player model, with a general specification. Two types of strategic interactions are considered.
The first is pre-emption: when there is some advantage to being the first to undertake an
investment, there will be competition to be the first. In this situation, any benefit from de-
laying investment due to real option effects has to be balanced against the loss from being
pre-empted. The second interaction arises when the value of an investment depends on the
number of agents who have also invested. The interaction may affect value negatively: e.g.,
if it arises through a competitive effect; or it may have a positive effect, if there are comple-
mentarities between the agents’ actions such as network externalities or demand expansion.
In both cases, the value and timing of an agent’s investment is influenced by the investment
decisions of others.
The contribution of this paper is to investigate the relationship between investment and
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uncertainty when the threat of pre-emption is present. We show that under certain conditions,
investment behaviour is significantly altered by the prospect of pre-emption. In a single-agent
setting with irreversible investment under uncertainty, the degree of uncertainty has a major
quantitative effect on investment behaviour. With a single state variable driving investment
returns, the level at which the single agent invests increases without bound as the degree of
uncertainty increases.
In contrast, we show that with two investors and the possibility of pre-emption, the effect
can be much more muted, depending on the type of equilibrium that occurs. Two types are
possible: either the agents invest sequentially (i.e., the ‘leader’ invests early while the ‘follower’
invests late), or they invest simultaneously. If equilibrium investment is always sequential, then
the leader’s investment point is insensitive, in relative terms, to the degree of uncertainty. Its
investment point is bounded above as uncertainty increases; indeed, we show that with certain
parameter values, greater uncertainty can lead the leader to invest earlier. (The follower, who,
once the leader has invested, acts like a single agent, behaves in the standard way.)
If, however, equilibrium investment is simultaneous, then the standard results apply: the
common investment point increases with uncertainty, and is unbounded as uncertainty grows.
(Note, however, that there is always an equilibrium in which investment occurs sequentially.)
We give the necessary and sufficient condition for simultaneous investment to be possible in
equilibrium; and we show how this condition depends on the degree of uncertainty.
In summary: we show that strategic interactions can give rise to significant qualitative and
quantitative effects that are omitted from the standard real options analysis of investment
under uncertainty.
Two general strands of literature are related to this paper. Real options models have been
used to explain delay and hysteresis arising in a wide range of contexts. McDonald and Siegel
(1986) and Pindyck (1988) consider irreversible investment opportunities available to a single
agent. Dixit (1989) and Dixit (1991) analyse product market entry and exit in monopolistic
and perfectly competitive settings respectively. The second strand of literature concerns timing
games of entry or exit in a deterministic setting. There are several types of paper within this
strand. Papers analysing pre-emption games include Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz, and Tirole
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(1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1987) and Lippman and Mamer
(1993) . Wars of attrition have been modelled by e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1986).
A number of real options models incorporating strategic interactions now exist. Smets
(1991) examines irreversible market entry in a duopoly facing stochastic demand. Simultane-
ous investment may arise only when the leadership role is exogenously pre-assigned. Conse-
quently, he does not consider fully the pre-emption externality. Perotti and Rossetto (2001)
analyse investments by a “platform” firm and a rival entrant. The two are distinguished by
the cost of investment, which is lower for the platform. Consequently, pre-emption plays no
part in their analysis, while it is central in ours. Weeds (2002) presents a model in which
two firms may invest in competing research projects with uncertain returns. She does not
impose an asymmetry between the firms, but allows the leader to emerge endogenously. She
does not, however, include more general externalities. Other papers combining real options
with game theory include Boyer, Lasserre, Mariotti, and Moreaux (2004), Huisman and Kort
(1999), Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) and Pawlina and Kort (2006); these, however, do
not generate the comparative static result we find. The general specification of our model
encompasses several of these contributions. Hoppe (2000) analyses a timing game of new
technology investment in an uncertain environment. She considers second, rather than first,
mover advantages and models uncertainty in a different way from our paper.
In a two-period model, Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) find that greater uncertainty over
market demand may increase cost-reducing investment undertaken in the first period. Their
model is quite different from ours: there is an exogenous asymmetry between the firms—only
firm 1 holds a strategic investment opportunity in the first period—and this firm exercises
a subsequent option (over production) in the second period. Although their result has a
superficial similarity to ours, it is driven by the strategic effect of first period investment
in reducing the competitor’s output in the second period (a` la Cournot), or deterring entry
altogether (as in Dixit (1980)), combined with optionality at the second stage. Since the first
period investment is available to a single firm, there is no competition in exercising the option.
In this paper, by contrast, our result is due to the effect of uncertainty on the equilibrium
outcome of the timing game between the players. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) describe situations
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in which uncertainty can speed up investment, because investment itself reveals information
about costs. We show that even in the absence of this ‘shadow value’, investment may be
speeded up by uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we set up the model.
Section 3 analyses the equilibria of the model, as well as deriving various benchmarks that can
be used to assess the effect of combining the threat of pre-emption with the real option incen-
tive to delay. Section 4 assesses when real options are important, asking: when are competitive
interactions so strong that they undermine option effects, transforming the relationship be-
tween uncertainty and investment? Section 5 discusses the applicability of real options to
various industry situations in light of our analysis. Section 6 concludes; the appendix contains
lengthier derivations.
2 The model
This section develops a reduced-form model to capture the three effects that are the focus
of this paper: (i) uncertainty, irreversibility and the possibility of delay in investment; (ii)
investment externalities, where the return to investment depends on the number and sequence
of investors; and (iii) pre-emption, where the early investor has an advantage, which may also
be persistent.
Two risk neutral agents, labelled i ∈ {1, 2} each can invest in a project. There is a
cost K > 0 to doing so, which is the same for both agents. Investment is irreversible (the
cost K is entirely sunk) and can be delayed indefinitely. Time is continuous and labelled by
t ∈ [0,∞). The timing of investment is the main concern of the analysis. Investment by
the two agents may occur sequentially—that is, the two agents invest at distinctly different
times—or simultaneously.
Consider first the outcome when the agents invest sequentially. Call the first investor
the ‘leader’ and the second investor the ‘follower’. The leader’s flow payoff at time t after
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investment, but before the follower has invested, is
piIL = θt,
where θt is the stand-alone benefit from investment—the flow payoff received by an agent who
has invested, when that agent is the sole investor. After the follower has invested, the leader’s
flow payoff becomes
piIIL = (1 + δL)θt.
The follower’s flow payoff at time t having invested is
piII2 = (1 + δF )θt.
Now suppose that the agents invest simultaneously. The flow payoff at time t having invested
is the same for both agents:
piIII = (1 + δS)θt.
We are interested in situations where pre-emption may occur; that is, where the relative
payoff to being the first to invest is sufficiently large. We therefore make assumptions on the
payoff parameters δL, δF and δS.
Assumption 1 (Payoffs) −1 < δF ≤ δL < 0 and −1 < δS < 0: investment is profitable
for the follower; there is an advantage to being the first-mover, which may be persistent; flow
payoffs when both agents have invested are less than the monopoly payoff.
We use reduced-form profit functions in order not to be tied to any particular model of
competition.1 Assumption 1 allows us to encompasses many related models. For example, in
1One model that is consistent with our set-up is as follows. Two agents decide when and where to enter
in a horizontally differentiated Hotelling-style market. There is an entry cost; entry is irreversible (the cost
is entirely sunk), and can be delayed indefinitely. Once an agent has entered, it can sell its product at zero
marginal cost and compete on price. There are three possible locations at which the agents can enter: at
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Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), when n firms have adopted the new technology, the payoff of
a firm that has not adopted is pi0(n), and of a firm that has adopted is pi1(n). They assume
that if n′ ≥ n, then pi1(n
′) < pi1(n). A specific version of their payoffs can be represented in
our model by supposing that pi0(n) = 0 ∀ n, pi1(1) = θ and δL = δF = δS < 0. Real options
duopoly models such as Smets (1991), Weeds (2002) and Huisman and Kort (1999) employ
functional forms equivalent to negative δL, δF and δS parameters. Similarly, some of the payoff
structures used in Katz and Shapiro (1987) can be replicated within our model. What they
term the ‘stand-alone incentive’ is measured by δL in this model; their ‘pre-emption incentive’
is measured by δL−δF ; the degree of imitation that is possible can be captured by δF . Lippman
and Mamer (1993) analyse a model in which the first firm to innovate spoils the market for its
rival; in this case, δF = −1. (While our analysis does not cover this exact case, since δF > −1,
we can come arbitrarily close to it.) Notice also that by setting δS = (δL + δF )/2, we can
allow for the possibility that, in the event of simultaneous adoption, the roles of leader and
follower are assigned randomly between the two agents. The main restriction in the reduced-
form payoffs is that they are not allowed to depend on the stochastic process driving the state
variable (i.e., the parameters µ and σ introduced below do not appear in the payoffs). This
is fine if the state variable is e.g., the size of the market; but may be more restrictive in other
settings.
θt is assumed to be exogenous and stochastic, evolving according to a geometric Brownian
motion (GBM) with drift:
dθt = µθtdt+ σθtdWt (1)
where µ ∈ [0, r) is the drift parameter, measuring the expected growth rate of θ, r is the
continuous-time discount rate,2 σ > 0 is the instantaneous standard deviation or volatility
x = 0, x = 0.5 and x = 1 (for simplicity). A first-mover advantage arises because the early adopter can locate
at x = 0.5 so as to attract more demand than the later adopter. If the agents enter simultaneously, then
they locate at opposite ends of the line. This game can be solved and equilibrium prices computed. They are
consistent with reduced-form parameter values such that −1 < δF < δL < δS < 0. Details are available from
the authors on request.
2The restriction that µ < r ensures that there is a positive opportunity cost to holding the ‘option’ to
invest, and so that the option is not held indefinitely.
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parameter, and dW is the increment of a standard Wiener process, dWt ∼ N(0, dt). The
parameters µ, σ and r are common knowledge and constant over time. The choice of continuous
time and this representation of uncertainty is motivated by the analytical tractability of the
value functions that result.
The strategies of the agents in the investment game are now defined. If agent i has not
invested at any time τ < t, its action set is Ait = {invest, don’t invest}. If, on the other hand,
agent i has invested at some τ < t, then Ait is the null action ‘don’t move’. The agent therefore
faces a control problem in which its only choice is when to choose the action ‘invest’. After
taking this action, the agent can make no further moves.
A strategy for agent i is a mapping from the history of the game Ht (the sample path of the
stochastic variable θ and the actions of both agents up to time t) to the action set Ait. Agents
are assumed to use stationary Markovian strategies: actions depend on only the current state
and the strategy formulation itself does not vary with time. Since θ follows a Markov process,
Markovian strategies incorporate all payoff-relevant factors in this game. Furthermore, if one
player uses a Markovian strategy, then its rival has a best response that is Markovian as well.
Hence, a Markovian equilibrium remains an equilibrium when history-dependent strategies
are also permitted, although other non-Markovian equilibria may then also exist. (For further
explanation see Maskin and Tirole (1988) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).)
The formulation of the agents’ strategies is complicated by the use of a continuous-time
model. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) point out that there is a loss of information inherent in
representing continuous-time equilibria as the limits of discrete time mixed strategy equilib-
ria. To correct for this, they extend the strategy space to specify not only the cumulative
probability that player i has invested, but also the ‘intensity’ with which each player invests
at times ‘just after’ the probability has jumped to one.3 Although this formulation uses mixed
strategies, the outcomes in any symmetric equilibrium are equivalent to those in which agents
3In Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), an agent’s strategy is a collection of simple strategies satisfying an
intertemporal consistency condition. A simple strategy for agent i in a game starting at a positive level θ of
the state variable is a pair of real-valued functions (Gi(θ), ǫi(θ)) : (0,∞) × (0,∞) → [0, 1] × [0, 1] satisfying
certain conditions (see definition 1 in their paper) ensuring that Gi is a cumulative distribution function, and
that when ǫi > 0, Gi = 1 (so that if the intensity of atoms in the interval [θ, θ + dθ] is positive, the agent is
sure to invest by θ). A collection of simple strategies for agent i, (Gθ
i
(.), ǫθ
i
(.)), is the set of simple strategies
that satisfy intertemporal consistency conditions.
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employ pure strategies. (See section 3 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).) Consequently, the
analysis will proceed as if each agent uses a pure Markovian strategy, i.e., a stopping rule spec-
ifying a critical value or ‘trigger point’ for the exogenous variable θ at which the agent invests.
Note, however, that this is for convenience only: underlying the analysis is an extended space
with mixed strategies.
Our analysis focuses on trigger points of the stochastic variable θ. These could also be
expressed in terms of expected stopping times; we do not, however, include this step. For our
comparative static results it is sufficient to recall that, for a given time path of the stochastic
variable, a lower trigger point corresponds to earlier investment.
The following assumptions are made:
Assumption 2 Investment is irreversible.
Assumption 3 E0
[∫
∞
0
exp (−rt)θtdt
]
−K < 0.
Assumption 2 requires that if agent i has invested by date τ , it then remains active at all
dates subsequent to τ . Assumption 3 states that the initial value of the project is sufficiently
low that the expected return from investment is negative, thus ensuring that immediate in-
vestment is not worthwhile. (The operator E0 denotes expectations conditional on information
available at time t = 0.)
3 Equilibrium
This section describes the two types of equilibrium, involving respectively sequential and
simultaneous investment, and derives the necessary and sufficient condition for simultaneous
investment to occur in equilibrium.
3.1 Sequential investment
Start by assuming that the agents invest at different points. As usual in dynamic games, the
stopping time game is solved backwards; see e.g., Dixit (1989). Thus the first step is to consider
the optimization problem of the follower who invests strictly later than the leader. Given that
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the leader has invested irreversibly, the follower’s payoff on investing has two components: the
flow payoff from the project, (1 + δF )θt; and the cost of investment, −K.
The follower’s value function F (θ) has two components, holding over different ranges of
θ: one relating to the value of investment before the follower has invested, the other to the
follower’s value after investment. We derive these value functions in the appendix. We show
there that the follower’s value function is
F (θ) =


bF θ
β θ < θF ,
(1+δF )θ
r−µ
−K θ ≥ θF
(2)
where β is a constant defined by
β ≡
1
2
−
µ
σ2
+
√(
1
2
−
µ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
> 1.
θF is the follower’s optimally-chosen investment point. (The value function in equation
(2) assumes that the leader invests at some level of θ less than θF . We verify below that this
is the case in equilibrium.) By arbitrage, the critical value θF must satisfy a value-matching
condition; optimality requires a second condition, known as ‘smooth-pasting’, to be satisfied.
(See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for an explanation.) These conditions give
θF =
(
β
β − 1
)(
K
1 + δF
)
(r − µ), (3)
bF =
(1 + δF )θ
−(β−1)
F
β(r − µ)
.
Equation (3) for the follower’s trigger point can be interpreted as the effective flow cost
of investment with an adjustment for uncertainty. The sunk investment cost is K, but this
yields a flow payoff of (1 + δF )θ; hence the effective sunk cost is
K
1+δF
. With an effective
interest rate of r − µ (i.e., the actual interest rate r minus the expected proportional growth
in the flow payoff µ), this gives an instantaneous cost of
(
K
1+δF
)
(r− µ). If a Marshallian rule
were used for the investment decision, the trigger point would be simply this cost. But with
uncertainty, irreversibility and the option to delay investment, the Marshallian trigger point
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must be adjusted upwards by the factor β
β−1
> 1.
Now let the value after investing first be denoted L(θ); in the appendix, we show that it
has the following form:
L(θ) =


θ
r−µ
−K + bLθ
β θ ∈ [0, θF ),
(1+δS )θ
r−µ
−K θ ≥ θF ,
(4)
given investment by the follower at θF . The term bLθ
β is an option-like effect, anticipating
subsequent entry by the follower. We show in the appendix that
bL =
δLθ
−(β−1)
F
r − µ
< 0.
That is, investment by the follower lowers the leader’s value (which is intuitive).
The next proposition describes the sequential equilibrium. The proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 1 (Sequential equilibrium) Given assumptions 1–3, when equilibrium invest-
ment is sequential, the leader invests at θP and the follower at θF > θP . θP is the unique
solution to the equation
θP − θM
θM
=
1
β − 1
(
1 + δF − βδL
1 + δF
)(
θP
θF
)β
(5)
in the interval (0, θL), where θM ≡ K(r − µ) is the Marshallian myopic trigger and θL ≡
(β/(β − 1))K(r − µ) is the single-agent trigger.
The explanation of the equilibrium follows Fudenberg and Tirole (1985): the leader’s
trigger point with pre-emption is determined by rent equalization. The leader cannot choose
its investment point optimally, as the follower can. Instead, the first agent to invest does
so at the point at which it prefers to lead rather than follow, not the point at which the
benefits from leading are largest. Clearly, it cannot be that the first agent invests when the
value from following is greater than the value from leading—if this were the case, the agent
would do better by waiting. Likewise, it cannot be that the first agent invests when the
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value from leading is strictly greater than the value from following, since in this case without
pre-assigned roles, the other agent could pre-empt it and still gain. Hence the investment
point is determined by indifference between leading and following. The trigger point θP in
the pre-emption model is given by indifference: L(θP ) = F (θP ). This is in contrast to the
trigger point of the follower, which is determined by value matching and smooth pasting, i.e.,
is chosen optimally.
3.2 Simultaneous investment
Now consider the alternative case, in which investment is simultaneous at the trigger point
θS. Note, however, that even when such an equilibrium exists, there is always an equilibrium
in which investment occurs sequentially; see Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).
The value function of each agent in the simultaneous investment equilibrium is
S(θ) =


bSθ
β θ < θS,
(1+δS )θ
r−µ
−K θ ≥ θS .
(6)
(This value function can be derived from the appropriate Bellman equation, following the steps
shown in the appendix.) There is a continuum of simultaneous equilibria; it is straightforward
to show that they can be Pareto ranked, with higher trigger points yielding higher value
functions. In this case, it seems reasonable that the agents invest at the Pareto optimal point,
given by both value matching and smooth pasting. So:
Proposition 2 (Simultaneous equilibrium) The Pareto optimal trigger point for the si-
multaneous equilibrium is
θS =
(
β
β − 1
)(
K
1 + δS
)
(r − µ).
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The coefficient in the value function is
bS =
(1 + δS)θ
−(β−1)
S
β(r − µ)
.
The next proposition describes when simultaneous investment can occur in equilibrium.
The proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 3 Simultaneous investment occurs in equilibrium iff
λE ≡ (1 + δS)
β −
(
1 + βδL(1 + δF )
β−1
)
≥ 0. (7)
When this condition is satisfied, therefore, two classes of equilibria exist: those with sequential
investment (characterized by proposition 1); and those with simultaneous investment (charac-
terized by proposition 2).
Whether there is an equilibrium with simultaneous investment is determined by whether
the leader wishes to invest before the follower, or at the same time (i.e., by the comparison of
L(θ) and S(θ)). The proposition shows the reasonable condition that, in order for simultaneous
investment to occur in equilibrium, it must be the case that δS is sufficiently large and/or δL
sufficiently small. Note that the simultaneous investment equilibrium, when it exists, Pareto
dominates the sequential outcome; this is an immediate consequence of the condition for
existence of the simultaneous investment equilibrium: S(θ) ≥ L(θ) for θ ∈ [0, θS].
4 Investment under uncertainty with pre-emption
The standard lessons from the literature on irreversible investment under uncertainty can be
seen readily in the case where the players’ roles are pre-assigned. In this case, it is easy to
show that the leader invests at the standard single-agent trigger given by
θL =
(
β
β − 1
)
K(r − µ);
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Figure 1: The standard real option effect: θL/θM against σ, with µ = 0
and the follower invests at θF . Both of these triggers are larger than the myopic Marshallian
trigger, θM (defined in Proposition 1). The size of the gap, due to real options effects, is driven
by the factor β/(β − 1), since θL = β/(β − 1) × θM . Figure 1 plots θL as a function of σ.
(Note that in this figure, µ is set to 0; this is why θL equals θM in the no-uncertainty limit as
σ → 0.4) The figure shows that, even at moderate levels of uncertainty, the real option effect
can be large. For example, with a volatility of 0.2 (i.e., a variance for the process in equation
(1) of 4%), the real options trigger θL is roughly a factor of 2 greater than the Marshallian
trigger θM . If the variance increases to 25, this factor increases to 5. (The corresponding
option values are also large.)
This is the standard story: see e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Our objective in this section
is to examine how the relationship between trigger points, and the impact of uncertainty, is
modified when pre-emption can occur.
4In the figure, r = 5%.
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4.1 The sequential equilibrium
We start by considering the sequential investment equilibrium. Clearly, the follower’s invest-
ment behaviour is unaltered by pre-emption: it invests at θF regardless. Our analysis therefore
focusses on the investment trigger of the leader, θP .
Proposition 4 (i) In the limit as σ → ∞, θP → θM/(δL − δF ). (ii) θP is non-decreasing in
σ. (iii) θP ≤ θM/(δL − δF ).
Proof. Part (i) follows immediately from equation (5), noting that as σ →∞, β → 1. For
the proof of part (ii), see the appendix. Part (iii) follows immediately from parts (i) and (ii).

The proposition shows that θP is bounded above by θM/(δL − δF ). This upper bound is
large when δL is close to δF . In particular, if there is no persistent first-mover advantage,
so that δL = δF , then as the degree of uncertainty grows, the pre-emption trigger increases
without bound. But with a positive first-mover advantage, δL > δF , there is a finite upper
bound for θP . This is in contrast to the follower’s trigger θF , which increases without bound
as σ becomes large. This is illustrated in figure 2, which shows the behaviour of θP and θL as
σ increases. (Note that, as in figure 1, µ is set equal to 0, with the consequence that θP and
θL both equal θM when σ = 0.)
5
The analysis so far has highlighted that pre-emption lowers the trigger point of the first-
mover when there is uncertainty. But we have shown that the effect of uncertainty on the
pre-emption trigger is quantitatively different: the pre-emption trigger is bounded as the
degree of uncertainty grows. This is in contrast to standard real options triggers, which grow
without bound as uncertainty increases.
To emphasise the different effects that uncertainty has on investment triggers with and
without pre-emption, we note the following possibility when assumption 1 is relaxed to allow
δL > 0. The proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 5 Joint sufficient conditions for the leader’s investment trigger θP to be decreas-
5Also, in this figure, r = 5 δL = −0.25, δF = −0.5 and K = 10. Hence θM = 0.5.
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Figure 2: θP and θL against σ, with µ = 0
ing in the volatility parameter σ are
1 + β ln(1 + δF ) < 0 and 0 ≤
(1 + δF ) ln(1 + δF )
1 + β ln(1 + δF )
≤ δL.
Proposition 5 raises the striking possibility that greater uncertainty lowers the leader’s
trigger point. The possibility is illustrated in figure 3, which plots θP/θM against σ when
δL = 0.2, δF = −0.5 and µ = 0; note that the latter parameter values ensures that θP = θM
when σ = 0.6
The possibility arises from the lack of optimality in the choice of the pre-emption trigger
point. An optimal trigger point is such that the marginal benefit from delaying investment for
a period equals the marginal cost. The marginal benefit is the interest saved on the investment
cost plus the expected gain from the possibility that the flow payoff increases. The marginal
cost is the flow payoff foregone by not investing. In this marginal calculation, the agent does
not consider the effect of its delay on the investment decision of the other agent, since in the
6The other parameter values used in the figure are: r = 5% and K = 10.
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Figure 3: Non-monotonicity of θP against σ
models considered in this paper, each agent’s trigger point (with the exception of θP ) does
not depend on the other’s. Increased uncertainty raises the expected gain from delay, causing
the (optimally chosen) trigger point to increase. This reasoning does not apply in the case
of θP , however: it is not chosen according to a marginal equality, but an absolute equality
between the value from leading and the value from following. The proposition shows that this
difference in the determination of the trigger point can lead to θP decreasing as uncertainty
increases.
Numerical analysis shows that the quantitative effect of this result is relatively small: θP
does not fall much below θM for any parameter values that we have used. Nevertheless, the
result reinforces the general message of this paper: competition for investment opportunities
alters the qualitative and quantitative conclusions about investment behaviour.
4.2 The simultaneous equilibrium
We now turn to the analysis of the simultaneous investment equilibrium. First note that θS has
the standard real options form. Its dependence on σ is driven by the factor β/(β − 1). The
more difficult question is to determine when equilibrium involves simultaneous investment:
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that is, when the necessary and sufficient condition
λE ≡ (1 + δS)
β −
(
1 + βδL(1 + δF )
β−1
)
≥ 0 (8)
holds. We provide a partial analysis in the next proposition; the non-linearity of the expression
for λE prevents a full characterization.
Proposition 6 1. limσ→0 λE = −1.
2. limσ→+∞ λE = δS − δL.
3. limσ→0 ∂λE/∂σ = 0.
4. If δF ≤ e
−
1
β − 1, then λE is an increasing function of σ.
The first part of the proposition tells us that simultaneous investment cannot occur in
equilibrium in the limit as σ → 0. Hence in the deterministic limit, only the sequential
equilibrium exists. The last part of the proposition shows that if δF is less than around -0.63,
then λE increases with σ. This sufficient condition is quite generous; numerical investigation
indicates that λE is increasing in σ for almost parameter values that we have used. Figure 4
illustrates λE, for the parameter values r = 5%, µ = 0, δL = −0.25, δS = −0.2, and δF = −0.4.
Note that the value of δF used does not satisfy the sufficient condition in the proposition;
nevertheless, λE is increasing in σ. For σ less than around 0.342, only the sequential investment
equilibrium exists; for larger values of σ, both types of equilibrium exist.
5 Applications
Real options theory teaches that, under uncertainty, irreversible investments will be delayed
compared with the traditional NPV rule. By contrast, the extensive literature on industrial
organization suggests that, when relatively few firms compete, there is often an advantage to
moving first. For example, the first investor may gain preferential access to scarce resources
or key skills, or may benefit strategically from making an early commitment to the market.
In many industry settings, then, a tension arises between pre-emption and delay, and the
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Figure 4: λE against σ
applicability of real options—at least in its usual, non-game theoretic form—becomes unclear.
If first mover advantages are strong, the optimal response may be to invest pre-emptively at
trigger point θP , relinquishing much of the option value of delay. In this situation, investment
behaviour (at least for the first mover) will be much closer to the NPV rule, and, as we have
demonstrated above, the impact of uncertainty will be mitigated.
The tension between real options and pre-emption has been recognised by a number of
authors. In the closing chapter of their book on real options, Copeland and Antikarov (2001)
point out the drawback of deferring investment in research when a firm is in a competitive
race to develop a new drug. Howell, Stark, Newton, Paxson, Cavus, Pereira, and Patel (2001)
refer to the danger of “[u]sing real options when we shouldn’t”in game theoretic situations,
stating that things are seldom clear cut in these cases. This limitation has also been discussed
in policy settings such as regulation. Despite accepting in principle that allowance might be
made for option values in estimating the cost of capital, Ofcom (2005) notes countervailing
first mover advantages and sees the applicability of real options as being restricted to just a
few cases.
The framework set out in this paper provides guidance on the applicability of real options to
various industry situations. The crucial condition is inequality (8): when this holds, equilibria
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exist in which both firms delay investment and uncertainty affects behaviour as real options
theory predicts; otherwise pre-emption occurs and the impact of uncertainty is much weaker.
Proposition 6 suggests that the outcome depends on the relative strengths of investment
complementarities (δS) and the persistent first mover advantage (δL).
If investment complementarities are strong, so that δS is large relative to δL, then λE is
positive (for sufficiently large σ). Assuming the Pareto dominant equilibrium is achieved, both
firms delay their investment and the prospect of pre-emption makes no difference to equilibrium
behaviour. This outcome might be expected in settings where the return to investment is
higher when other firms also invest: for example, network markets (e.g., telecommunications),
industries where standard-setting is important (e.g., media recording formats such as CDs
and DVDs), vertical relationships (e.g., manufacturers and suppliers) and in the presence of
demand spillovers (e.g., advertising that stimulates demand for a product class, not just an
individual product). In these situations, the predictions of real options theory may be expected
to fit reasonably well.
If, on the other hand, there is a persistent first mover advantage such that δL is large relative
to δS, then λE is negative in the limit as σ →∞ (our numerical investigations indicate that λE
is then negative for all values of the volatility parameter). In this case, equilibrium investment
is always sequential, with one firm forfeiting the option value of delay to pre-empt its rival.
Several relevant situations come to mind. Patent races are characterised by lasting first mover
advantage: the first to invent (or first to file) gains an exclusive right over the technology,
which other firms must not infringe. Systems wars between incompatible technologies (e.g.
Windows vs. Apple Mac, VHS vs. Betamax) are also instances where a first mover advantage
tends to persist. Entry into industries with substantial economies of scale also tends to confer
long-lasting benefit: incumbents are difficult to displace and typically earn high returns. In
these situations, then, one might expect to observe pre-emptive investment, and relatively
little sensitivity to uncertainty.
When equilibrium investment is sequential, the leader’s investment timing (i.e. the level
of its trigger, θP ) then depends on the comparison between the leader’s and the follower’s
payoffs, with an upper bound given by θM/(δL−δF ). If the follower’s payoff is relatively large,
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competition to be the first mover is weaker and investment can be delayed for a time. But
if the follower’s payoff is very low, pre-emption destroys most if not all of the leader’s option
value and its investment timing will be close to the NPV rule. This is likely to be the case in
e.g., a patent race or entry into a natural monopoly industry.
6 Conclusions
This paper has analysed irreversible investment in a project with uncertain returns, when there
may be a persistent advantage to being the first investor, and externalities to investing when
others also invest. It therefore extends standard real options analysis to a setting where there
are general strategic interactions and externalities between investing agents. This framework
captures a variety of strategic situations and industry settings, and encompasses a number of
earlier contributions.
We have shown that two distinct patterns of investment behaviour are possible in equilib-
rium. The relationship between investment and uncertainty depends on the type of equilib-
rium: while the simultaneous investment equilibrium displays standard real options properties,
comparative statics of the pre-emption trigger in a sequential investment equilibrium are quite
different. Thus, strategic interactions and externalities, omitted from standard real options
analysis, can have important qualitative and quantitative effects on the relationship between
investment and uncertainty.
In the light of our analysis, we have provided guidance on the applicability of real options
to a number of industry situations. The general framework we employ allows for various types
of strategic interactions between firms found in the industrial organization literature to be
captured. Depending on comparisons between investment complementarities, persistent first
mover advantage and follower’s payoff, predictions can be made for the timing of investment—
in particular, the incidence of pre-emption and delay—and the sensitivity of investment to
uncertainty.
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Appendix
A Value functions
Let the follower’s value functions be denoted F0 and F1, before and after its investment
respectively.
Prior to investment, the follower holds an option to invest but receives no flow payoff.
In this ‘continuation’ region, in any short time interval dt starting at time t the follower
experiences a capital gain or loss dF0 . The Bellman equation for the value of the investment
opportunity is therefore
F0 = exp (−rdt)Et [F0 + dF0] . (A.9)
Itoˆ’s lemma and the GBM equation (1) gives the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
1
2
σ2θ2F ′′0 (θ) + µθF
′
0(θ)− rF0(θ) = 0. (A.10)
From equation (1), it can be seen that if θ ever goes to zero, then it stays there forever.
Therefore the option to invest has no value when θ = 0, and must satisfy the boundary
condition F0 = 0. Solution of the differential equation subject to this boundary condition
gives F0 = bF θ
β , where bF is a positive constant and β > 1 is the positive root of the
quadratic equation Q(z) = 1
2
σ2z(z − 1) + µz − r; i.e., β = 1
2
(
1− 2µ
σ2
+
√(
1− 2µ
σ2
)2
+ 8r
σ2
)
.
Now consider the value of the agent in the ‘stopping’ region, in which the value of θ is such
that it is optimal to invest at once. Since investment is irreversible, the value of the agent in
the stopping region is given by the expected value alone with no option value terms. There
are two possibilities. In the first, the follower invests strictly after the leader. When the level
at time t of the state variable is θt, the follower’s value function in this case is
F1(θt) = Et
[∫
∞
t
exp (−r(τ − t))(1 + δF )θτdτ −K
]
.
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θ is expected to grow at rate µ, so that
F1(θt) =
(1 + δF )θt
r − µ
−K. (A.11)
In the second possibility, the follower invests at exactly the same point as the leader. In
this case, the follower’s value function is
F2(θt) = Et
[∫
∞
t
exp (−r(τ − t))(1 + δS)θτdτ −K
]
==
(1 + δS)θt
r − µ
−K. (A.12)
The boundary between the continuation region and the stopping region is given by a
trigger point θF of the stochastic process such that continued delay is optimal for θ < θF and
immediate investment is optimal for θ ≥ θF . The optimal stopping time TF is then defined as
the first time that the stochastic process θ hits the interval [θF ,∞) from below.
Putting together the two regions gives the follower’s value function:
F (θ) =


bF θ
β θ < θF ,
(1+δF )θ
r−µ
−K θ ≥ θF ,
(A.13)
given that the leader invests at some θ′ < θF . If the leader invests at the same time as the
follower, then F (θ) = (1 + δS)θ/(r − µ)−K.
For the agent who invests first, there are two possibilities. The first is that it invests
at some θ < θF i.e., at some time t < TF . In this case, there are two components to the
agent’s value function, holding over different ranges of θ. The first component L1 holds after
the leader has invested, but before the follower has done so; and the second component L2,
after the follower has invested. The second component is equivalent to that of the follower,
determined previously. The first component is new, and so is derived in detail.
After the leader has invested, it has no further decision to take and its payoff is given by
the expected value of its investment. This payoff is affected, however, by the action of the
follower investing at the strictly later point θF . Taking account of subsequent investment by
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the follower, the leader’s post-investment payoff is given by
L1(θt) = Et
[∫ TF
t
exp (−r(τ − t))θτdτ +
∫
∞
TF
exp (−r(τ − t))(1 + δL)θτdτ −K
]
. (A.14)
By standard calculations, this becomes
θt
r − µ
−K +
( θt
θF
) δLθF
r − µ
≡
θt
r − µ
−K + bLθ
β
t .
The first part of the value function L1 gives the expected value of investment before the
follower invests, while the second is an option-like term reflecting the value to the leader of
future investment by the follower.
The second possibility for the agent who invests first is that it invests at some θ ≥ θF i.e.,
some time t ≥ TF . In this case, the leader’s post-investment payoff is given by
L2(θt) = Et
[∫
∞
t
exp (−r(τ − t))(1 + δS)θτdτ −K
]
=
(1 + δS)θt
r − µ
. (A.15)
B Proof of Proposition 1
The follower’s equilibrium investment point, θF , is given by equation (3). In this proof, we
derive the leader’s investment point and establish that it is given by rent equalization.
Define
∆(θ) ≡
θ
r − µ
−K −
(
θ
θF
)β (
1− βδL + δF
1 + δF
)
K
β − 1
(B.16)
i.e., L(θ) − F (θ), where L(θ) is conditional on the leader having invested, and F (θ) is condi-
tional on the leader having invested but not the follower. There are three possibilities: that
there are (i) no, (ii) one or (iii) multiple roots of expression (B.16). We use the following facts:
(i) ∆(θ) is a continuously differentiable function of θ; (ii) ∆(0) = −K < 0 (and ∆(θ) < 0 for
all θ < θ0, by assumption 3); (iii) ∆(θL) > 0; (iv) θL < θF .
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Fact (iii) requires further proof. Using the definition of θL = (β/(β − 1))K(r − µ),
∆(θL) =
K
(β − 1)(1 + δF )
(
βδL
(
θL
θF
)β
+ (1 + δF )
(
1−
(
θL
θF
)β))
.
Since δL ≥ δF > −1 (by assumption 1),
∆(θL) ≥
K
(β − 1)(1 + δF )
(
βδF
(
θL
θF
)β
+ (1 + δF )
(
1−
(
θL
θF
)β))
=
K
β − 1
(
βδF (1 + δF )
β−1 + 1− (1 + δF )
β
)
.
Let φ(δF ) ≡ βδF (1+ δF )
β−1+1− (1+ δF )
β.7 Note that φ(0) = 0; and φ′(δF ) = β(β−1)δF (1+
δF )
β−2, which is ¡ (=) 0 when −1 < δF < (=)0. Hence φ(δF ) > 0 for all δF ∈ (−1, 0). Hence
∆(θL) > 0 for all δF ∈ (−1, 0).
Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a value θP < θL such that ∆(θP ) =
0, and ∆(θ) is less (greater) than 0 for θ immediately less (greater) than θP . Further that
there is only one such θP in the interval (0, θL). To see this, note that 1 − βδL + δF ≥ 0, by
assumption 1, since δL ≤ 0 and δD > −1. Hence ∆(θ) is concave, with ∆(θL) > 0. Therefore
∆(θ) = 0 has a unique solution θP in (0, θL). Hence in the sequential equilibrium, no agent
invests when θ ∈ [θ0, θP ). At θ = θP < θL, the leader invests; at θF > θP , the follower invests.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that one agent follows the strategy: “invest at θS if the other agent has yet to
invest; otherwise invest at the sequentially rational point in the continuation game”. The
sequentially rational point in the continuation game is θF if the other agent invests at some
θ < θF ; otherwise, it is immediate investment. The other agent then has three options: (i)
invest at θ > θS; (ii) invest at θ = θS ; (iii) invest at θ < θS. It is clear that option (i) is
dominated by option (ii). Option (ii) has a value of S(θ) ≡ bSθ
β for θ ≤ θS: see equation
equation (6). Now consider option (iii). From equation (4), the value to the agent from
7We are grateful to the referee for suggesting the following argument.
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investing at θ < θS is
L(θ) =
θ
r − µ
−K + bLθ
β .
The agent will choose option (ii) (i.e., investment will be simultaneous in equilibrium) iff
S(θ) ≥ L(θ) for all θ ≤ θS. We now establish parametric conditions so that S(θ) ≥ L(θ) for
all θ ≤ θS.
Note that S(θ) is an increasing and strictly convex function of θ, with S(0) = S ′(0) = 0;
while L(θ) is a concave function of θ, with L(0) = −K and L′(0) = 1/(r − µ) > 0. Hence
there is a unique θ0 > 0 such that S
′(θ0) = L
′(θ0). θ0 is given by
βbSθ
β−1
0 =
1
r − µ
+ βbLθ
β−1
0 . (C.17)
There are then three possibilities: (i) θ0 ≤ θL; (ii) θL < θ0 ≤ θS; (iii) θS < θ0. We examine
each possibility in turn.
(i) θ0 ≤ θL.
Equation (C.17) can be rearranged to give
θβ−10 =
θβ−1L
(1 + δS)β − βδL(1 + δF )β−1
.
Hence θ0 < θL iff
(1 + δS)
β − βδL(1 + δF )
β−1 > 1.
But also note that
S(θ0) = bSθ
β
0 =
θ0
β(r − µ)
+ bLθ
β
0
≥
θ0
r − µ
−K + bLθ
β
0 = L(θ0).
(The inequality in the second line follows from θ0 < θL = (β/(β − 1))K(r − µ).) And
since S(θ) is convex and L(θ) concave, this implies that S(θ) > L(θ) for all θ ≤ θS .
(ii) θL < θ0 ≤ θS .
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From case (i), it is clear that, since θ0 > θL, S(θ0) < L(θ0). Therefore there are no
parametric conditions in this case such that S(θ) ≥ L(θ) for all θ ≤ θS.
(iii) θS < θ0.
In this last case, by previous arguments S(θ0) < L(θ0). But since θ0 > θS, it is still
possible that S(θ) ≥ L(θ) for all θ ≤ θS. We now show that, in fact, this is not the case.
Rearranging equation (C.17) gives
θβ−10 =
(1 + δS)
β−1θβ−1S
(1 + δS)β − βδL(1 + δF )β−1
.
Hence θ0 > θS iff
(1 + δS)
β−1
(1 + δS)β − βδL(1 + δF )β−1
> 1;
or
δS(1 + δS)
β−1 − βδL(1 + δF )
β−1 < 0. (C.18)
If S(θ) ≥ L(θ) for all θ ≤ θS, then (obviously) S(θS) ≥ L(θS). This requires that
bSθ
β
S =
(1 + δS)θS
r − µ
−K ≥
θS
r − µ
−K + bLθ
β
S
where the first equality is the value-matching condition for θS. Substituting for θS and
bL gives
δS(1 + δS)
β−1 − δL(1 + δF )
β−1 ≥ 0. (C.19)
Since δL < 0 and β ≥ 1, equation (C.18) implies that
δS(1 + δS)
β−1 − βδL(1 + δF )
β−1 > δS(1 + δS)
β−1 − δL(1 + δF )
β−1.
Hence equations (C.18) and (C.19) cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Therefore it
cannot be that θS < θ0 and S(θS) ≥ L(θS).
26
In summary: S(θ) ≥ L(θ) for all θ ≤ θS iff θ0 ≤ θL i.e., iff
(1 + δS)
β − βδL(1 + δF )
β−1 > 1.
Rearranging gives the necessary and sufficient condition of equation (7).
D Proof of part (ii) of Proposition 4
The difference between the values of the leader’s option-like term and the follower’s option
associated with the follower’s investment is
∆(θ, β) ≡ (bL1 − bF )θ
β =
(
βδL − (1 + δF )
1 + δF
)
F (θ)
where F (θ) ≡ bF θ
β > 0 for θ ∈ (θP , θF ). The objective of the proof is to establish that
∂∆(θP , β)/∂β ≥ 0, so that ∂∆(θP , β)/∂σ ≤ 0, which means that the leader’s value function
increases by less than the follower’s (evaluated at θ = θP ) for a small increase in σ. If this is
the case, then θP must increase in σ.
We start by evaluating the derivative of ∆(θ, β) with respect to β:
∂∆(θ, β)
∂β
=
δLF (θ) + (βδL − (1 + δF ))
∂F (θ)
∂β
1 + δF
.
But
∂F (θ)
∂β
= F (θ) ln
(
θ
θF
)
.
Hence
∂∆(θ, β)
∂β
=
F (θ)
1 + δF
(
δL + (βδL − (1 + δF )) ln
(
θ
θF
))
(D.20)
for θ ∈ [θP , θF ].
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Now note that θP ≤ θL. Hence
ln
(
θP
θF
)
≤ ln(1 + δF ).
We show, through contradiction, that ∂∆(θP , β)/∂β > 0. So, suppose not i.e., suppose
that ∂∆(θP , β)/∂β ≤ 0. In order for this inequality to hold, it must be that
δL + (βδL − (1 + δF )) ln
(
θP
θF
)
≤ 0. (D.21)
A sufficient condition for this inequality to be satisfied is
δL + (βδL − (1 + δF )) ln(1 + δF ) ≤ 0.
(Here, we have used the fact that, from assumption 1, βδL − (1 + δF ) ≤ 0.) Since δF < 0, in
order for this inequality to be satisfied for all values of β, it must be that
φ(δL) ≡ δL + (δL − (1 + δF )) ln(1 + δF ) ≤ 0.
Note that φ(0) = −(1+ δF ) ln(1+ δF ) > 0; and φ(δF ) = δF − ln(1+ δF ) > 0. (Both statements
follow from assumption 1: −1 < δF < 0.) Since φ(δL) is linear in δL, this means that φ(δL) > 0:
a contradiction. Therefore ∂∆(θP , β)/∂β > 0.
E Proof of Proposition 5
The proof follows the proof of proposition 4. δL ≤ −(βδF − (1 + δF )) ln(1 + δF ) is a sufficient
condition for ∂∆(θP , β)/∂β ≤ 0. Re-arranging this inequality yields
δL(1 + β ln(1 + δF )) ≤ (1 + δF ) ln(1 + δF ). (E.22)
This inequality cannot be satisfied if 1+β ln(1+δF ) > 0 and assumption 1 holds (in particular,
δL ≥ δF ). To see why, notice that equation (E.22) would require in this case that δL ≤ δL,
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where, as in the proposition,
δL ≡
(1 + δF ) ln(1 + δF )
1 + β ln(1 + δF )
and δL ≤ 0. Assumption 1 then requires that δL ≥ δF . But this in turn requires that
(β − 1)(1 + δF ) ln(1 + δF )− β ln(1 + δF ) + δF ≤ 0. When β = 1, this inequality requires that
− ln(1+ δF )+ δF ≤ 0, which is violated for all δF ∈ [−1, 0) and holds with equality only when
δF = 0. Since (β− 1)(1+ δF ) ln(1+ δF )−β ln(1+ δF )+ δF is increasing in β , this means that
(β − 1)(1 + δF ) ln(1 + δF )− β ln(1 + δF ) + δF ≥ 0, with equality only when δF = 0.
Hence inequality (E.22) requires that 1+β ln(1+ δF ) < 0 ; and hence that δL ≥ δL, where
δL ≥ 0.
F Proof of Proposition 6
The first three parts follow from straightforward calculation. To show the last part, differen-
tiate λE with respect to σ:
∂λE
∂σ
=
∂λE
∂β
∂β
∂σ
.
Since β is decreasing in σ, ∂λE/∂σ has the opposite sign to ∂λE/∂β. Differentiation gives
∂λE
∂β
= (1 + δS)
β ln(1 + δS)− δL(1 + δF )
β−1(1 + β ln(1 + δF )). (F.23)
It is sufficient for λE to be an decreasing function of β (and hence to be increasing in σ) that
all terms in equation (F.23) be negative. Hence joint sufficient conditions are: (i) δS ≤ 0,
so that ln(1 + δS) ≤ 0; (ii) −δL(1 + ln(1 + δF )) ≤ 0, which is satisfied when δL ≤ 0 and
1 + ln(1 + δF ) ≤ 0, i.e., δF ≤ e
−1 − 1.
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